This paper assesses the ability of local housing ordinances to prevent neighborhood destabilization. We evaluate the degree to which vacancy registrations and point-of-sale inspection requirements infl uenced housing market outcomes following the housing crisis. With comprehensive real property data from Cuyahoga County, Ohio, we measure outcomes that characterize housing market distress including foreclosures, sales below the tax-assessed value, bulk sales, fl ipping, and property tax delinquency. We compare outcomes across properties in regulated and unregulated municipalities using matching procedures on linked data containing property, loan, and transaction characteristics. We fi nd evidence that vacancy registrations substantially reduce foreclosures. Registrations are also negatively associated with tax delinquency and sales below a property's tax-assessed value in some specifi cations. In contrast, we fi nd little evidence that point-of-sale inspections reduce undesirable transactions. Rather, properties in cities with inspection requirements displayed higher levels of foreclosure and tax delinquency relative to the control group during the study period.
Introduction
In recent years, hundreds of local jurisdictions across the country have passed foreclosure and vacancy registration ordinances to mitigate neighborhood destabilization. Before the housing crisis, 87 ordinances were on the books. The number exploded to 538 by 2012 (Lee et al., 2013) . These local housing ordinances are being passed despite the fact that little is known about their effectiveness. This study seeks to inform these policy decisions by evaluating the performance of local ordinances that were in place before the housing crisis.
Cuyahoga County, Ohio, contains the city of Cleveland and 57 of its suburbs. Sixteen of the county's suburban municipalities enacted housing ordinances prior to 2004. By comparing matched properties in cities with and without the ordinances, we are able to estimate the extent to which the ordinance protected neighborhoods from destabilization.
In this analysis, we estimate the impact of three types of housing ordinances -vacancy registrations, point-of-sale inspections, and point-of-sale inspections with escrow requirementson five measures related to housing market stability: foreclosures; selling below tax-assessed value; bulk sales; flipping; and tax delinquency. Vacancy registrations enable cities to monitor vacancy and impose a cost on owners who fail to keep homes occupied. The point-of-sale inspection ordinances require that a licensed inspector report a home's defects to potential buyers. Inspection ordinances are intended to maintain the quality of the housing stock.
We expect these ordinances to discourage unhealthy housing market transactions because they reduce the value of selling a home in poor condition "as is." Vacancy registrations increase carrying costs and should discourage property speculators who are trying to profit from short-term appreciation rather than attracting rental tenants. As the foreclosure crisis unfolded, these ordinances passed years earlier might have protected some municipalities from the worst types of neighborhood destabilization.
Using comprehensive real property data from Cuyahoga County, we match homes in cities with an ordinance in place prior to the housing crisis to homes in cities with no ordinance in place prior to the crisis. After controlling for a rich set of observables, we find that vacancy registrations do seem to reduce foreclosure rates. The registrations are also consistently associated with lower incidence of sales below the tax-assessed value, bulk sales, and tax delinquency, and these relationships are significant in some specifications. On the other hand, we find evidence that point-of-sale inspections are associated with higher incidence of foreclosures and tax delinquency. There is some evidence that point-of-sale inspections appear to discourage flipping. While point-of-sale inspections might have other long-term benefits, it appears that vacancy registrations are better at improving the indicators of neighborhood stability that we are able to measure in this analysis.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the intent and function of the ordinances. Section 3 specifies the hypotheses and estimation methods. Section 4 describes the data and linking process, section 5 presents results, and the last section concludes.
Background
Cuyahoga County, like urban centers throughout the Midwest and Northeast, endured an epidemic of predatory real estate speculation during the foreclosure crisis (Kotlowitz, 2009 ).
Lenders amassed huge inventories of real-estate-owned (REO) properties (Immergluck, 2011) .
They sold these properties in bulk and at steep discounts to speculators who resold them to less sophisticated investors (C. Coulton and Hirsch, 2010) . This "flipping" activity is usually accompanied by extended periods of vacancy, and it allows the housing stock to deteriorate and be vandalized (Fitzpatrick IV and Whitaker, 2012; Whitaker, 2011) . Unsophisticated investors, surprised by the major repairs the homes need, often dumped the properties for less than their tax-assessed value. In other cases, investors quit paying the property taxes and abandon the homes (Ergungor and Fitzpatrick IV, 2011 ).
Foreclosures and flipping by neglectful investors can have devastating effects on the property values of nearby homes (Whitaker and Fitzpatrick IV, 2013) . Neighborhoods are desta-bilized when they experience a vicious cycle of discounted foreclosed homes lowering property values, and falling property values forcing underwater borrowers into foreclosure. Foreclosed homes are more likely to become vacant, abandoned, and blighted properties, which can drive away a neighborhood's current residents and potential buyers. The local ordinances studied here are considered neighborhood-stabilization policies because they aim to prevent, slow, or stop these downward spirals.
The most common ordinances require registration of foreclosed or vacant property or require pre-sale inspections and an escrow account.
1 The details of the ordinances vary, but, generally, a corporation or individual that owns a vacant property in a city with a registry must repeatedly (monthly, quarterly, or annually) complete registration paperwork and pay registration fees. Complying with these ordinances can be a significant cost, especially in terms of staff time, for managers of large REO portfolios. Registered properties are often subject to additional periodic inspections for code violations. While not recurring, pointof-sale inspections require additional time, expense and effort when undertaking a property transaction. These ordinances require an inspection of each home before it can be sold.
Where escrow accounts are required, the seller or buyer must deposit sufficient funds to make needed repairs before the transfer of title is allowed. In either case, the buyer receives the most recent inspection report. While buyers in any city can (and often do) voluntarily pay for an inspection, inspections are not normally required by law or by lenders. Lenders do require appraisals based on comparable sales, but appraisers do not look for maintenance problems as inspectors do. Inspection ordinances should provide an incentive for property owners to keep up with preventative maintenance. If they do not, they may face large repair expenses when they attempt to sell their house.
Despite the existence of several extensive related literatures, evaluations of local policies in light of the housing crisis are still rare. In the urban, real estate, and housing economics literatures, there are many evaluations longstanding federal housing programs, such as the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (Baum-Snow and Marion, 2009; Eriksen and Rosenthal, 2010; Quigley, 2000) . There is a substantial literature on local land use laws that can impact housing markets by allowing or restricting supply growth (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2003; Speyrer, 1989) . The capitalization of local property taxes into home prices has been well understood for decades (Oates, 1969) . There have been estimates of the capitalization of other local public policies, such as school quality (Downes and Zabel, 2002) and hurricaneresistance building codes (Dumm et al., 2011) .
A few studies have looked at the interaction of local policies and the housing crisis.
Glasgow, Lewis, and Neiman present evidence that California cities with more restrictive development policies suffered less following the housing bust (2012). Johnson and Turcotte develop a model that determines which foreclosed properties a municipality should purchase to minimize the social costs caused by the distressed properties (2010). Our analysis is like Glasgow, Lewis and Neiman's work in that we are interested in policies that were in place before the crisis, not enacted as a response. We share with Johnson and Turcotte a focus on distressed properties. Preventing properties from becoming distressed, or mitigating that distress, can help maintain the values of neighboring homes according to the now numerous estimates of a distressed property's externalities (Biswas, 2012; Campbell et al., 2011; Harding et al., 2009; Immergluck and Smith, 2006; Leonard and Murdoch, 2009; Lin et al., 2009; Rogers and Winter, 2009; Schuetz et al., 2008; Whitaker and Fitzpatrick IV, 2013) .
Our contribution to this literature is evaluating local policies that were both aimed at preventing distressed properties and in place before the housing crisis.
Hypotheses and Methods
As in other old industrial cities, decades of population decline have generated a growing stock of vacant and abandoned properties in Cleveland and some of its inner-ring suburbs. In the short run, however, point-of-sale inspections can create substantial costs, and even hardship for homeowners. If inspections reveal the need for costly repairs, the seller has to bear those costs immediately, either by paying for the repair or lowering the sale price. In the absences of the inspections, the cost will probably eventually be borne by the buyer, but this could be delayed by years.
2
The vacancy registration is best thought of as a tax on vacancy and an additional carrying cost for any owner other than an owner occupant. Fees associated with the registrations are small relative to the property taxes, but the value of time needed to comply with the regulation could be higher, especially for an investor or lender with a large portfolio. This additional cost should motivate lenders to foreclose less aggressively. It should motivate institutional owners to divest of their properties faster than usual, by lowering prices if necessary.
The housing ordinances may have had unintended impacts on foreclosures and subsequent transactions. There is a general concern expressed by the lending and servicing community that vacancy registrations and point-of-sale inspection ordinances, among others, will "create impediments to smooth foreclosures" (Pollard, 2012) . Anti-vacancy and anti-blight ordinances may provide an incentive for banks to foreclose less or less quickly on low-value property. Because the ordinances would increase the probability of being caught violating housing codes, lenders may be wary to take ownership of property that is already in violation of housing codes. Registry compliance costs could eat into a lender's expected recovery value and cause additional "bank walk-aways" in marginal cases. These incentives could contribute to the stability of a neighborhood by decreasing foreclosures. However, borrowers who are in default due to financial hardship may also stop maintaining the home or leave the home vacant if they assume a foreclosure will be initiated soon. When the banks do foreclose on low-value properties, the laws could also encourage them to surrender the REO inventory to land banks or similar entities that can demolish or rehabilitate the homes.
2 In thinking about the point-of-sale inspections, we had in mind the following example. A borrower purchases a home in 2004 for $120,000 with 20 percent down and a $96,000 mortgage. By 2008, the home has depreciated 10 percent to $108,000, and the outstanding balance on the loan is $91,000. The borrower needs to sell the house to relocate. She believes she has $17,000 in equity to use toward her next down payment. A buyer offers $108,000, but the point-of-sale inspection reveals that a $20,000 repair is needed. Now the seller is underwater. If she can, she must borrow or take funds out of savings to cover the repair. She may decide that letting the home go into foreclosure is her best or only option. If scenarios like this are common enough, they could cause point-of-sale inspections to have a net positive impact on foreclosures. Investors must plan to pay these when they have periods of vacancy between tenants + Reveal the need for expensive repairs; Sellers must drastically reduce the sale price to allow part of the buyer's down payment to be used for the repair, or to compensate the buyer for accepting the home as-is + Increase carrying cost, which encourages sellers to reduce their time on market by lowering prices
Tax delinquency -Maintain neighborhood property values and discourages owner or bank walk-aways -Maintain property values, which discourages owner and bank walk-aways + Discourage flip investors, which lowers banks' expected recovery value and encourages walk-aways + Increases carrying costs, which encourages owner and bank walk-aways Table 1 : Hypothesized channels of influence relating local housing ordinances to measures of neighborhood destabilization.
To test these hypotheses, we match homes treated by ordinances with homes untreated by ordinances. A sold home is considered treated if it is in a city that has enacted any one or more of these ordinances before 2004. After 2004 some cities enacted rules as a direct response to the foreclosure crisis, which makes the treatment clearly endogenous. In this later period, we would expect to find higher levels of housing distress in places with recently instituted ordinances. We restrict our definition of treatment to earlier ordinances that were a response to the long-term problems of vacancy and abandonment in the region. While treatment assignment is by no means random, we believe that selection into treatment at the city level does not convey knowledge of the future housing market collapse. For example, cities with local governments that are very concerned about housing blight may have been more likely to enact and enforce ordinances early on to better understand or attempt to address the problem. This, in turn, may have better prepared them to respond to the following housing downturn. Thus, finding that ordinance properties fair better than those without an ordinance could be explained by the focus of local government leaders rather than the ordinances themselves. Alternatively, early ordinances could be a response to higher levels of blight at which externalities of distressed housing are higher. If this is the case, we would expect to find a negative correlation between ordinances and good housing outcomes, with the underlying cause being that cities with ordinances faced larger externalities at the onset of the housing crisis. Given these identification issues, the assumption of strong ignorability is made only after matching properties over a rich set of variables at the parcel, neighborhood, transaction and borrower levels.
To clarify the identification strategy, we are interested in estimating the mean difference in outcomes due to the ordinance, which is the treatment effect on the treated. We do not observe realizations for the counterfactual, which is the outcome for a property in an ordinance city, had it not been subject to the ordinance. Instead, we must create a proxy for the counterfactual using the outcomes for untreated properties in cities without ordinances.
Strong ignorability implies that the control variables are rich enough to eliminate the bias originated when using this proxy for the counterfactual. We are aware that this is a strong assumption, so we are careful to build a rich set of observable covariates and account for them through matching using a propensity score matching criteria. In the estimated propensity score equation, the coefficients serve as weights that reflect the relative strength of the correlations between the covariates and the treated status. These weights should create a close alignment of the distributions of the observables and unobservables in the treated and untreated samples.
3
Propensity score matching techniques are usually applied in situations where individual units of observation are selected into treatment (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) . However, in this analysis, homes are selected into treatment in groups defined by their municipality. All homes in a municipality are either treated or untreated. Matching at the city level is not practical because the counts of cities are too small to support hypothesis testing. Matching at the tract level is possible. However, aggregating the data breaks the connection between the property and loan characteristics and the outcomes observed for individual houses. The propensity score is defined as the probability that a property is treated conditional on its characteristics (P (T = 1|X)), which lacks a direct interpretation in the ordinance effect problem. We can argue that selection into treatment occurs at the city level, in response to earlier, city-wide housing distress. Selection could possibly occur at the owner occupant level if local ordinances were to influence the decision to buy across cities. So while it is not possible to interpret the propensity score as the probability that a property selects into treatment (the ordinance), we can say that estimates of probability of treatment (P (T = 1|X)) from a logistic regression provide a score of the likelihood that the property belongs to a distribution that is observationally similar to the distribution of properties subject to ordinances.
Data
We use data from the following sources: Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), Cuyahoga County Recorder, Cuyahoga County Auditor, the Decennial Censuses and the American Community Survey. 4 HMDA contains loan level data on loan characteristics such as lending 3 Formally, let Y 1i and Y 0i be outcomes for property i when the property is (T = 1) and is not (T = 0) subject to the ordinance, respectively. We are estimating the treatment effect on the treated (TT): E(Y 1 − Y 0 |T = 1). We do not observe realizations for the counterfactual Y 0 |T = 1, but we do observe realizations of Y 0 |T = 0. Strong ignorability implies that the control variables in X are rich enough to eliminate the bias originated when using parameters of the observed variable Y 0 |T = 0 to proxy for the • Early Foreclosure: if the house went into tax or mortgage foreclosure and was sold at sheriff's sale within two years after the first sale.
• Foreclosure: if the house went into tax or mortgage foreclosure, and the next sale was at a sheriff's auction, any time after the first sale.
• Sale Below Assessed Value: if the next sale price was below the most recent assessed value in the property tax records. Tax-assessed values in Cuyahoga County are intended to be below market values, so a sale price that is lower yet indicates a large, recent decline in value.
• Bulk Sale: if the next sale is part of a bulk sale. Sales are identified as "bulk" if the sale is one of several sales recorded with the same seller and the same buyer on a single day.
• Flip: if the house was re-sold within the first two years after the first sale (not including sales out of REO).
• Tax Delinquency: if the property was tax current before the first sale and becomes tax delinquent before it resells.
We are also interested in seeing whether there is an impact of the ordinances on outcomes beyond the next sale and outcomes for homes that have not sold recently. Table 3 are much more similar after the matching, but some differences remain. We include all the components of the score, such as house price, square footage, and college attainment, in the regressions to account for the differences that remain. 
Properties Sold

All observations
Results
In table 3 , we see that the ordinance cities have significantly lower mean values in only two instances among the seventeen distress measures. Ordinance cities have significantly higher means for twelve of the measures. In a pure matching strategy, the difference between the mean outcomes of the treated and untreated groups serves as the estimate of the treatment effect. The mean differences here contrast treatment with any ordinance versus no ordinance.
However, because we are interested in the effects of three distinct ordinances, and some cities require both registrations and inspections, we need to estimate models with indicators of the specific treatments. At the same time, we can control for the property-specific characteristics observable in our data. In the parcel models (table 6) Point-of-sale inspections are associated with significantly higher probability that a parcel will transfer in an non-distress sale during the study period.
Matched Sales
6 The point-of-sale ordinance is estimated to increase the incidence of foreclosure by 0.009, which is a substantial increase relative to the treatment mean of 0.04. We attempted two additional alternate specifications which speak to the robustness of the main results. The outcome variables are dichotimous in some cases and take the form of low counts (1, 2, 3, etc.) in others. We attempted logistic and Poisson specifications in place of the linear models. The results were very similar and would support the same policy-relevant conclusions. One might also be concerned that there is a fundamental difference between a central city and any suburb, even if it is only in the perception of certain market participants.
For example, some investors might perceive the central city as lacking the will or ability to enforce housing laws, and therefore they might attempt certain types of transactions in city neighborhoods that they would not attempt in any suburb. If this is the case, central-city parcels and sales should not be used in a comparison group for suburban treated properties.
We ran our analysis after excluding all Cleveland observations, which constitute 31 percent of the matched sales and 24 percent of the matched parcels. The coefficient estimates change somewhat but the patterns of sign and significance remain. This gives us confidence that our results are not being driven by a city/suburb contrast.
Conclusions
As in most cities across the country, the cities in our study area all had to deal with distress in some fraction of their housing stock during the last decade. Above some threshold, housing problems destabilized neighborhoods. Our goal here was to assess whether, and to what extent, local ordinances protected neighborhoods from housing problems.
Vacancy registrations appear to have more desirable effects on neighborhood stability.
Homes under these ordinances are significantly less likely to go through a foreclosure. We may be concerned that the vacancy registration lowers foreclosure by encouraging lenders to walk away from their collateral, rather than by maintaining neighborhood home values.
However, if this were the case, we should see elevated tax delinquency among bank walk aways. In our results, the relationship between vacancy registrations and tax delinquency is consistently negative and in some specifications, significantly so. This suggests the vacancy registration ordinances are not encouraging owners to abandon properties.
We do not find evidence that point-of-sale inspections, with or without escrow requirements, reduce foreclosures, bulk sales, or sales of homes below their assessed value. Instead, we find these inspections without escrow to be associated with higher levels of foreclosure,
and an approximately 20 percent higher incidence of tax delinquency. Inspections with escrow requirements are also associated with higher tax delinquency.
Point-of-sale inspections may have a very long run benefit which is not detectable in a study such as this one that focuses on a crisis period. Our identification strategy requires that we match homes of similar value because home values summarize hundreds of unmeasured factors. It is possible that neighborhoods full of homes of similar vintage and quality have seen their values drift downward over the last couple decades, and therefore do not enter the comparison group for homes whose maintenance has been required by law. Additional research is needed to confirm or refute this hypothesis. In the meantime, municipalities will have to decide if some other justification, such as residents' safety, is sufficient for keeping or adding point-of-sale inspections. Vacancy registrations, although not without cost, do seem to lessen the incidence of foreclosure. Therefore they should be considered by cities that are concerned that a future housing crisis could destabilize their neighborhoods. 
